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Abstract 
Within just over one month of coming into operation in May 2014, the new Bail Act 2013 (NSW), a product 
of long-term law reform consideration, was reviewed and then amended after talk-back radio ‘shock jock’ 
and tabloid newspaper outcry over three cases. This article examines the media triggers, the main 
arguments of the review conducted by former New South Wales (NSW) Attorney General John 
Hatzistergos, and the amendments, with our analysis of the judicial interpretation of the Act thus far 
providing relevant background. We argue that the amendments are premature, unnecessary, create 
complexity and confusion, and, quite possibly, will have unintended consequences: in short, they are a 
mess. The whole process of reversal is an example of law and order politics driven by the shock jocks 
and tabloid media, the views of which, are based on fundamental misconceptions of the purpose of bail 
and its place in the criminal process, resulting in a conflation of accusation, guilt and punishment. Other 
consequences of the review and amendments process recognised in this article include the denigration 
of judicial expertise and lack of concern with evidence and process; the disproportionate influence of the 
shock jocks, tabloids and Police Association of NSW on policy formation; the practice of using retired 
politicians to produce ‘quick fix’ reviews; and the political failure to understand and defend fundamental 
legal principles that benefit us all and are central to the maintenance of a democratic society and the rule 
of law. The article concludes with some discussion of ways in which media and political debate might be 
conducted to produce more balanced outcomes. 
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Within	 just	 over	 one	month	 of	 coming	 into	 operation	 in	May	 2014,	 the	 new	Bail	Act	2013	
(NSW),	a	product	of	 long‐term	 law	reform	consideration,	was	 reviewed	and	 then	amended	
after	talk‐back	radio	‘shock	jock’	and	tabloid	newspaper	outcry	over	three	cases.	This	article	
examines	 the	media	 triggers,	 the	main	arguments	 of	 the	 review	 conducted	by	 former	New	
South	 Wales	 (NSW)	 Attorney	 General	 John	 Hatzistergos,	 and	 the	 amendments,	 with	 our	
analysis	of	the	judicial	interpretation	of	the	Act	thus	far	providing	relevant	background.	We	
argue	 that	 the	 amendments	 are	 premature,	 unnecessary,	 create	 complexity	 and	 confusion,	
and,	quite	possibly,	will	have	unintended	consequences:	in	short,	they	are	a	mess.	The	whole	




article	 include	 the	 denigration	 of	 judicial	 expertise	 and	 lack	 of	 concern	with	 evidence	 and	
process;	the	disproportionate	influence	of	the	shock	jocks,	tabloids	and	Police	Association	of	
NSW	 on	 policy	 formation;	 the	 practice	 of	 using	 retired	 politicians	 to	 produce	 ‘quick	 fix’	
reviews;	and	the	political	failure	to	understand	and	defend	fundamental	legal	principles	that	
benefit	us	all	and	are	central	to	the	maintenance	of	a	democratic	society	and	the	rule	of	law.	




























reflected	 in	 the	 Bail	 report	 of	 the	 NSW	 Law	 Reform	 Commission	 (LRC)	 (2012)	 and	 the	
subsequent	 passing	 of	 the	 new	Act	with	 the	 key	 features	 of	 this	 legislation	 highlighted.	 After	
little	more	 than	 one	month	 in	 operation,	 however,	 the	 new	Act	was	 called	 into	 question	 in	 a	
media	storm	centred	on	three	cases	and	the	NSW	Liberal‐National	Party	Coalition	government	
initiated	 a	 review,	 presided	 over	 by	 former	 Labor	 Party	 (the	 main	 opposing	 party	 to	 the	

























complex	 presumptions	 against	 bail	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 ch	 3)3	 which	 led	 to	 a	 soaring	 remand	




Discussion,5	 followed	 by	 extensive	 consultations	 with	 all	 interested	 parties,	 including	 NSW	
Police,	 and	 the	 circulation	 of	 a	 preliminary	 draft	 for	 comment.	 The	 final	 Report	 was	 then	
considered	by	 the	Attorney	General	and	his	Department	and	a	 response	was	published	(NSW	












The	 Government	 anticipates	 that	 dispensing	 with	 the	 system	 of	 presumptions	
will	 not	 only	 simplify	 the	 bail	 decision	 making	 process,	 but	 will	 also	 result	 in	
fewer	 amendments	 to	 the	 legislation	 enabling	 it	 to	 remain	 simple	 and	 clear,	 as	





removal	 of	 the	 old	 complexity	 of	 presumptions;	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 purposes	 section;	






not	adopt	 the	NSW	LRC’s	 recommendation	of	an	explicit	presumption	 in	 favour	of	bail	 for	 all	
offences,	it	provides	in	the	purposes	section,	that	a	bail	authority	in	making	a	bail	decision	is	to	
have	regard	to	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	an	accused’s	general	right	to	be	at	liberty	(s	
3(2)).	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 statutory	 construction,	 when	 construing	 a	 provision	 of	 the	 Act,	 a	
‘construction	 that	 would	 promote’	 those	 purposes	 is	 to	 be	 ‘preferred	 to	 a	 construction	 that	
would	not’:	see	Interpretation	Act	1987	(NSW)	s	33.	
	














If	 there	 are	unacceptable	 risks,	 the	 ‘second	 step’	or	 assessment	must	be	undertaken	with	 the	
bail	 authority	 considering	whether	 those	 risks	 can	be	mitigated	by	 imposing	conditions.	 Such	
conditions	 may	 be	 requirements	 as	 to:	 conduct	 (s	 25);	 security	 (s	 26);	 character	
acknowledgements	(s	27);	accommodation	(s	28);	pre‐release	(s	29);	and	enforcement	(s	30).	
Again,	such	conditions	are	not	new	but	what	is	very	different	is	that	conditions	can	now	only	be	
imposed	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 mitigating	 an	 unacceptable	 risk	 (s	 24(1)).	 Furthermore,	 such	
conditions	 must	 be	 ‘reasonable,	 proportionate	 to	 the	 offence	 for	 which	 bail	 is	 granted,	 and	
appropriate	to	the	unacceptable	risk	in	relation	to	which	they	are	imposed’	(s	24(3)).	This	was	
specifically	designed	to	target	problems	with	the	old	Bail	Act	1978	where	conditions	were	often	
















16	 June	 to	 Hassan	 ‘Sam’	 Ibrahim,	 the	 former	 head	 of	 the	 Parramatta	 chapter	 of	 the	 Nomads	
outlaw	motorcycle	gang	charged	with	 selling	multiple	 illegal	 firearms	across	western	Sydney;	







in	 operation	 the	 recently	 appointed	NSW	Premier	Mike	Baird8	 and	 his	 new	Attorney	General	
Brad	Hazzard	caved	in	to	the	media	pressure	and	on	27	June	2014	announced	a	review	of	the	
new	 Act	 by	 former	 Labor	 Party	 Attorney	 General	 Hatzistergos	 (Baird	 2014a).	 The	 Terms	 of	
Reference	were	broadly	framed	and	heavily	rhetorical	with	repeated	references	to	the	need	to	
protect	 the	 community	 (NSW	 Government	 2014).	 The	 Premier’s	 public	 statements	 also	
expressed	a	similar	preoccupation:	
	





On	5	August	2014	Hatzistergos’s	Review	of	 the	Bail	Act	2013	 (2014)	 (herein	after	 the	Review	
Report),	was	made	public.	The	Review	Report	makes	12	recommendations	(Hatzistergos	2014:	
11‐13).	Three	are	the	most	significant	and	the	most	damaging	to	the	new	Act’s	regime.	In	this	










2014:	 [96]).	 The	 only	 evidence	 offered	 for	 this	 alleged	 confusion	 is	 a	 reference	 to	 one	















v	Morris	 (Unreported,	NSWSC,	McCallum	 J,	 20	May	2014,	 as	 cited	 in	Rodger	 2014).	 This	 case	
involved	 an	 Aboriginal	 woman	 who	 was	 charged	 with	 one	 larceny	 offence	 and	 had	 been	 in	
custody	for	two	months	at	 the	time	of	 the	bail	application.	McCallum	J	 found	that	Ms	Morris’s	
background	placed	her	 in	a	category	of	person	with	a	special	vulnerability	under	 the	Act	 in	 s	
17(3)(j)	for	she:	
	
…	 came	 from	 a	 background	 of	 severe	 deprivation	 including	 her	 subjection	 to	
violence,	 sexual	 abuse	 and	 movement	 between	 family	 and	 foster	 parents.	 In	
addition,	her	mother	was	murdered	when	she	was	a	 teenager	and	 she	suffered	







of	 innocence	and	the	general	right	 to	be	at	 liberty:	s	3	of	the	Act.	The	weight	of	
that	consideration	is	reinforced	 in	the	present	case	by	relevant	evidence	of	the	













The	 second	 significant	 recommendation	 is	 to	 collapse	 the	 two‐stage	 test	 for	 determining	
‘unacceptable	risk’	into	one	(Hatzistergos	2014:	[14];	Rec	2).	The	recommended	single‐step	test	
would	involve	determining	unacceptable	risk,	with	an	expanded	list	of	risk	factors	(Hatzistergos	
2014:	 [15];	 Recs	 3‐4),	 and	 by	 reference	 also	 to	 the	 bail	 conditions	 that	 might	 be	 imposed	
(Hatzistergos	2014:	 [14];	Rec	2).	Three	 reasons	underpin	 this	 recommendation:	 the	ability	 to	
impose	 conditions	 prior	 to	 finding	 ‘unacceptable	 risk’	 (Hatzistergos	 2014:	 [140]);	 alleged	
problems	in	the	application	of	the	unacceptable	risk	test;	and	the	community	finding	it	hard	‘to	




risk	as	a	pre‐requisite	 for	 imposing	conditions	 (Lago:	 [28]).	Aside	 from	 this	one	 instance,	our	
examination	of	the	cases	shows	no	evidence	of	a	problem	regarding	the	imposition	of	conditions	
and	more	importantly	no	confusion	over	the	application	of	the	two‐stage	unacceptable	risk	test.	
















evaluations	 is	not	 foreign	 to	 the	courts,	 this	being	undertaken	 in	 the	context	of	 various	other	
statutory	regimes.10		
	
In	 deciding	whether	 there	 is	 an	unacceptable	 risk	 by	 reference	 to	 the	matters	 in	 s	 17(3),	 the	
cases	demonstrate	that	judges	are	logically	working	through	the	matters.	For	example,	in	Hawi,	
one	 of	 the	 cases	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 storm	 that	 triggered	 the	 review,	 Justice	 Harrison	
methodically	worked	 through	each	of	 the	 s	17(3)(a)‐(l)	 factors	 (Hawi:	 [24]‐[40]).11	By	way	of	
example,	we	note	in	relation	to	s	17(3)(a),	Justice	Harrison	stated:	
	
The	 Crown	 accepts	 that	 Mr	 Hawi's	 background	 and	 community	 ties	 are	 in	 his	
favour.	This	is	particularly	evident	from	material	tendered	on	his	behalf	without	
objection	in	the	form	of	unchallenged	affidavits	from	family	members	offering	to	
provide	 security	 by	way	 of	 surety	 for	 his	 release,	 subject	 to	 conditions,	 if	 that	













 the	 accused	 person’s	 community	 ties	 (s	 17(3)(a))	 may	 indicate	 that	 there	 is	 no	
‘unacceptable	 risk’	 thereby	 justifying	 a	 grant	 of	 bail	 to	 a	 different	 State	 (R	 v	 Justice	
(Unreported,	NSWSC,	Schimdt	J,	28	May	2014,	cited	in	Rodger	2014:	6);	see	also	Hawi:	
[25]);	
 evaluations	 of	 the	 ‘nature	 and	 seriousness	 of	 the	 offence’	 (s	 17(3)(b)),	 especially	 if	 it	
involves	extreme	violence	such	as	murder,	may	alone	be	a	basis	for	finding	unacceptable	
risk	(Lago:	 [15]),	however,	 the	 ‘nature’	of	 the	offence	even	 if	 serious	may	arise	 from	a	
























The	 third	 and	most	problematic	 recommendation	 is	 the	 introduction	of	 categories	of	 ‘serious	
offences’	 (Hatzistergos	 2014:	 12;	 Rec	 6)	 for	 which	 an	 accused	 person	 would	 have	 to	 ‘show	
cause’	 as	 to	 why	 the	 accused’s	 detention	 is	 not	 justified	 (Rec	 5).	 The	 stated	 reason	 for	 this	
recommendation	 is	 to	 ‘provide	 a	useful	 level	 of	 reassurance	 for	 the	 community	 in	 relation	 to	
serious	 offenders	 whilst	 also	 providing	 a	 greater	 level	 of	 consistency’	 (Hatzistergos	 2014:	
[220]).	 The	 Review	 Report	 implies	 (at	 [188]‐[191])	 that	 this	 is	 required	 because	 while	 bail	
decisions	 in	 the	Supreme	Court	appropriately	weigh	 the	 relevant	s	17(3)	 factors	 (particularly	




In	 evaluating	 this	 recommendation,	 it	 is	 instructive	 to	 return	 to	 the	 three	 cases	 mentioned	
above	that	triggered	the	review	and	which	produced	the	supposed	level	of	community	anxiety	
around	 the	 new	 Act.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 recall	 that,	 when	 bail	 was	 granted	 in	 each	 of	 these	
matters,	 no	 judgments	 or	 reasons	 were	 made	 public.12	 This	 created	 a	 vacuum	 in	 which	 the	
media	dramatised	the	idea	that	the	Act	was	‘soft	on	crime’	and	the	community	was	potentially	at	
risk	 by	 having	 such	 accused	 persons	 on	 bail.	 Furthermore,	 with	 no	 published	 reasons,	 this	
meant	there	was	no	possible	‘counter‐argument’	to	explain	the	basis	for	the	decisions.	This	is	to	
be	 lamented,	 particularly	 as	 two	 of	 the	 judgments	 were	 later	 made	 available	 which	 provide	
detailed	reasons	as	to	why	conditional	bail	was	granted.13	Thus,	the	decision	in	Fesus	indicates	
that	 new	 forensic	 evidence	 became	 available	 at	 the	 bail	 application	 that	 impacted	 on	 the	
strength	of	the	prosecution	case	(s	17(3)(c))	and	this	factor,	taken	together	with	the	length	of	
time	 since	 offending	 (17	 years),	 led	 Adams	 J	 to	 grant	 conditional	 bail.	 Justice	 Harrison’s	
judgment	 in	Hawi	 sets	 out	 (as	 noted	 above)	 the	 reasoned	 basis	 for	 granting	 conditional	 bail.	
Hawi’s	murder	conviction	appeal	had	also	been	upheld	by	 the	NSW	Court	of	Criminal	Appeal,	
with	 the	 Chief	 Justice	 favouring	 a	 complete	 acquittal	 and	 the	 two	majority	 judges	 ordering	 a	
retrial.14	Ultimately,	Hawi	pleaded	guilty	 to	 the	manslaughter	of	Zervas	on	5	September	2014	
and	bail	was	not	 opposed	by	 the	Crown	 (Bibby	2014a),	 raising	 serious	questions	about	what	
this	whole	scenario	was	actually	about.	In	the	final	matter	(Ibrahim),	no	first	instance	or	appeal	



















Bill	 accepts	 all	 of	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	 Review	 Report	 as	 they	 ‘…	 are	 common‐sense	
changes’	(Hazzard	2014:	9).	The	Second	Reading	speech	concludes:	
	









the	 right	balance,	 the	 evidence	 (as	discussed	 above)	 suggests	 otherwise.	But	 the	Government	
may	get	more	 than	 it	bargained	 for	with	some	unintended	effects	of	 the	amending	provisions	
discussed	below.		
	







justice	system	(b).	Resort	 to	a	preamble	 is	old	 fashioned	and	has	generally	been	discontinued	
(Pearce	 &	 Geddes	 2011:	 [1.32]).	 The	 clear	 purpose	 is	 to	 reduce	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 bail	
authority	 having	 regard	 to	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 –	 a	 regard	 that	 has	 not	 featured	
strongly	in	the	cases	analysed	–	with	the	assumption	that	a	preamble	is	not	usually	construed	as	
part	 of	 the	 Act.15	 If	 this	 construction	 is	 upheld	 by	 the	 courts,	 a	 cornerstone	 of	 our	 criminal	
justice	system	–	 the	presumption	of	 innocence	–	 is	 significantly	downgraded.	 Ironically,	given	
the	rhetoric	around	the	asserted	need	for	the	2014	amendments,	the	legislation’s	expression	of	
principles	 regarding	 community	 safety	 has	 also	 been	 consigned	 to	 the	 relatively	 innocuous	
location	of	the	preamble.		
	
Secondly,	 s	17	 introduces	a	new	concept	of	 ‘bail	 concern’	not	otherwise	known	 to	bail	 law	 in	
NSW	 or	 any	 other	 Australian	 jurisdiction,	 and	 certainly	 not	 in	 the	 equivalent	
Victorian/Queensland	unacceptable	risk	models.	Thus,	 the	amending	provisions	require	a	bail	
authority	to	assess	any	‘bail	concerns’	before	making	a	bail	decision	(s	17(1)).	A	‘bail	concern’	is	
one	 that	relates	 to	 the	 former	 factors	used	 to	assess	 ‘unacceptable	risks’	 in	s	17(2)	(failing	 to	
appear;	commit	a	serious	offence;	endanger	safety	of	victims,	individuals	or	the	community;	or	
interfere	 with	 witnesses).	 In	 assessing	 the	 ‘bail	 concern’	 the	 bail	 authority	 must	 take	 into	
account	 only	 the	 matters	 in	 s	 18,	 which	 is	 comprised	 of	 an	 expanded	 list16	 of	 the	 matters	
previously	 used	 to	 assess	 unacceptable	 risk	 in	 s	 17(3).	 Importantly,	 these	 factors	 now	 also	
include	any	bail	 conditions	 that	 could	 reasonably	be	 imposed	 to	address	any	bail	 concerns	 (s	
18(1)(p))	 whereas	 previously	 such	 conditions	 could	 only	 be	 imposed	 to	 mitigate	 an	
‘unacceptable	 risk’.	 The	 clear	 intent	 is	 to	 allow	 bail	 conditions	 to	 be	 imposed	 at	 the	 lower	
threshold	of	a	‘bail	concern’:	that	is,	even	if	no	‘unacceptable	risk’	is	identified.	This	is	in	direct	















witnesses)	 but	 not	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 s	 18	 matters.17	 While	 s	 19(1)	 indicates	 that	 a	 bail	
authority	is	to	refuse	bail	if	satisfied,	‘on	the	basis	of	an	assessment	of	bail	concerns	under	this	
Division,	 that	 there	 is	an	unacceptable	risk’,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	marry	s	19(1)	with	s	19(2).	Thus,	




how	 the	 bail	 authority	 moves	 from	 an	 assessment	 of	 ‘bail	 concerns’	 in	 s	 18	 to	 the	 higher	









the	 former	Bail	Act	1978	 (discussed	above).	While	 the	Review	Report	argues	 for	 a	distinction	
between	a	 show	cause	 test	 to	offence‐based	 ‘presumptions’	 at	 [222],	 the	distinction	 is	poorly	
explained	and	appears	to	be	one	of	semantics:		
	
The	 show	cause	 test	 is	different	 to	 the	previous	offence‐based	presumptions	 in	
the	 1978	 Act.	 Offence‐based	 presumptions	 indicate	 the	 bail	 outcome	 that	 an	
accused	is	expected	to	receive.	Where	an	accused	cannot	rebut	the	presumption,	
the	presumption	has	operative	force.	This	does	not	work	within	an	unacceptable	















The	 show	 cause	 test,	 is	 further	 problematic	 because,	while	 it	 clarifies	 that	 if	 a	 person	 shows	
cause	 the	 unacceptable	 risk	 test	 must	 still	 be	 applied	 prior	 to	 bail	 being	 granted	 (the	
Queensland/Victorian	 provisions	 were	 equivocal19),	 it	 may	 complicate	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
‘unacceptable	 risk’	 test	 further.	 Section	 19(3)	 provides	 that	 where	 a	 person	 has	 shown	 that	
detention	is	not	justified	this	‘is	not	relevant	to	the	determination	of	whether	or	not	there	is	an	
unacceptable	 risk’.	 The	 Queensland	 and	 Victorian	 cases	 suggest	 that	 an	 accused	 may	 show	







mean	 that	 the	 factors	 taken	 into	 account	 for	 showing	 cause	 cannot	 be	 re‐assessed	 for	 the	
making	 of	 a	 bail	 decision	 of	 ‘unacceptable	 risk’?	If	 that	 is	 so,	 this	 would	 be	 particularly	










principles	 under	 the	Act	 discussed	 in	 this	 article	will	 now	have.	 Indeed,	will	magistrates	 and	





What	 are	 we	 to	 make	 more	 generally	 of	 the	 sudden	 media‐driven	 reversal	 of	 bail	 reform	
outlined	above?	Do	we	just	add	it	to	the	list	as	yet	another	example	of	the	irrationality	of	public	
policy	making?	We	suggest	there	are	some	wider	features	that	go	beyond	the	specific	instance	
that	 are	 worth	 highlighting	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 outbreak	 of	 regressive	 criminal	 justice	
legislation	in	a	range	of	jurisdictions,	not	least	in	Queensland,	Victoria	and	NSW.	These	features	
include:	the	denigration	of	judicial	expertise	and	lack	of	concern	with	evidence	and	process;	the	
power	of	 the	 ‘shock	 jocks’,	 tabloids	and	police;	 and	political	 failure	 to	understand	and	defend	





contrast	 to	 the	 NSW	 LRC	 Report	 and	 process,	 the	 Review	 Report	 involved	 little	 or	 no	 new	
research.	Its	arguments	do	not	arise	out	of	empirical	analysis	nor,	as	analysed	above,	was	there	
evidence,	after	one	month’s	operation,	of	any	judicial	concern	over	the	interpretation	of	the	Act.	
What	 is	 the	 point	 in	 investing	 time	 and	 expense	 in	 the	 extensive	 consultative	 inquiries	 if	 the	








‘out	 of	 touch’	 and	 ‘not	 reflecting	 community	 values’	 has	 been	 lack	 of	 preparedness	 to	 take	
contested	 cases	 on	 appeal	 or,	where	 they	 are	 taken	 on	 appeal,	 to	wait	 for	 the	 results	 before	
changing	the	law.	A	clear	example	was	the	introduction	of	the	NSW	‘one	punch’	law	in	response	
to	the	media	and	public	outcry	over	the	sentence	handed	down	in	2013	to	Kieran	Loveridge	for	














It	 is	easier	 for	 the	Police	Association	of	NSW	(the	NSW	police	union)	to	complain	 to	the	Daily	
Telegraph	 or	 selected	 shock	 jocks	 and	 initiate	 a	media	 campaign	 than	 request	 the	DPP	 to	 go	
through	 the	normal	 criminal	 justice	processes.	During	his	 campaign	against	 the	bail	 laws	Ray	
Hadley,	a	high	rating	radio	‘shock	jock’,	‘claimed	on	his	2GB	radio	program	to	have	received	400	
emails	 from	 serving	 police	 officers	 complaining	 about	 magistrates	 decisions’	 (Olding	 2014).	
Such	recourse	to	the	media	often	produces	quicker	results	than	reliance	on	legal	processes,	as	
politicians,	 unprepared	 to	 argue	 for	 principles	 or	 await	 established	 legal	 processes,	 rush	 to	
change	laws	in	response	to	media	criticism.	In	this	way	the	level	of	public	trust	in	the	judiciary	
and	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 is	 constantly	 eroded,	 to	 the	 long‐term	 detriment	 of	 legal	
integrity	 (Hindess	 and	 Sawyer	 2004).22	 This	 process	 feeds	 into	 an	 increasingly	 uncivil	 public	
discourse.	Instant	experts	abound.	People	who	would	not	think	of	looking	over	the	shoulder	of,	




Another	 feature	of	 these	events	 is	 the	growing	practice	of	using	 former	politicians	to	produce	



















large	 number	 of	 crimes	 and	 introducing	 presumptions	 against	 bail	 for	 crimes	
including	drug	importation,	firearm	offences,	repeat	property	offences,	and	riots,	


















Attorney	 General	 Brad	Hazzard	 appointed	 to	 this	 position	 in	 April	 2014.	 Speaking	 about	 the	
shifting	 of	 the	 onus	 to	 defendants	 to	 prove	 that	 they	 should	 be	 granted	 bail	 under	 the	
amendments,	he	stated:	‘I	have	no	doubt	that	needed	to	be	changed,	and	they	[defendants]	now	
have	to	convince	the	court	on	behalf	of	the	community	they	should	be	allowed	out,	and	I	don’t	
really	 see	 that	 as	a	 big	 deal.’	 (Huntsdale	 2014,	 emphasis	 added)	 If	 Attorneys	 General	 cannot	
respect	the	presumption	of	innocence	and	the	role	of	bail	in	protecting	the	value	of	liberty,	how	
are	we	to	expect	shock	jocks	and	tabloid	journalists	to	do	so?	And	is	an	explosion	in	the	remand	















NSW	LRC	Report	 as	 part	 of	 a	 pre‐emptive	 attack	 on	 the	Report,	 commenced	 even	 before	 the	
Commission’s	final	recommendations	had	been	settled.	On	one	front	page	of	the	Daily	Telegraph	
Greg	Smith	was	pictured	as	turning	from	Rambo	to	a	marshmallow,	accompanied	by	a	banner	






the	 government,	 particularly	 on	 financial	 grounds,	 until	 pressure	 was	 applied.	 According	 to	
Pelly,	‘the	pressure	came	largely	from	one	source:	2GB	[radio]	Ray	Hadley’:	
	









named	 Police	 and	 Justice	 Department.	 The	 result	 of	 this	 was	 that,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 NSW	
history,	the	Attorney	General	was	junior	in	status	to	the	Police	Minister.	In	Premier	Baird’s	April	
2014	ministerial	appointments,	this	was	Mike	Gallacher,	who	was	subsequently	forced	to	resign	












The	 initial	downgrading	of	 the	position	of	 the	Attorney	General	vis‐a‐vis	 the	Police	Minister	 is	
another	 illustration	 of	 the	 power	 and	 influence	 wielded	 by	 the	 Police	 Association	 of	 NSW.	
Gallacher	was	a	former	President	of	this	organisation.	Increasingly,	NSW	government	responses	
to	significant	criminal	justice	issues	have	been	driven	by	the	Police	Minister,	and	indirectly	the	
Police	 Association,	 rather	 than	 the	 Attorney	 General.	 This	 came	 to	 a	 head	 in	 outbursts	 from	
Barry	O’Farrell	who	claimed	that	the	judiciary	were	‘out	of	touch’	after	one	bail	decision	(Davies	
and	Patty	2012)	and	again	over	 the	Thomas	Kelly	 ‘one	punch’	 case	where	he	 called	 for	more	
judges	and	magistrates	 to	be	 selected	 from	 the	police	because	 the	police	were	more	 in	 touch	
with	 community	 values.	 The	 Police	 Association	 sees	 its	 role	 not	 simply	 as	 protecting	 the	
industrial	 interests	 of	 its	 members	 but	 also	 in	 securing	 the	 widest	 possible	 police	 powers,	
irrespective	 of	 whether	 that	 is	 desirable	 in	 the	 broader	 public	 interest	 of	 maintaining	
democratic	traditions	of	liberties	and	rights	(Sentas	and	Cowdery	2013).		
	
This	 is	 not	 a	new	development.	Mark	Finnane	has	 traced	 the	history	of	 police	union	 political	
power	back	to	the	1920s,	noting	that	‘the	annual	conferences	of	police	unions	in	Australia	have	
been	 a	 standing	 item	 in	 the	 diaries	 of	 ministers	 responsible	 for	 police,	 their	 shadows	 in	
opposition,	 and	occasionally	even	a	premier’	 (Finnane	2000:	5).	Notable	 examples	of	political	
interventions	occurred	in	NSW	by	way	of	selective	non‐enforcement	of	public	order	offences	as	
part	 of	 a	 campaign	 against	 the	 repeal	 of	 the	 Summary	 Offences	 Act	 1970	 (NSW)	 (Egger	 and	
Findlay	1988),	 in	Queensland	 in	the	wake	of	 the	Fitzgerald	Inquiry	(1989)	and	 in	the	role	 the	
Police	 Association	 of	 Victoria	 played	 in	 bringing	 down	 three	 Police	 Commissioners:	 Comrie,	
Nixon	 and	Overland	 (Bachelard	 and	Munro	 2011).	 Finnane	 (2000:	 17)	 concluded	 that	 ‘police	






Another	 feature	of	the	events	 is	the	 fickleness	of	politicians	and	their	 inability	 to	stand	up	for	
principles.	 Amongst	 various	 rule	 of	 law	 principles	 are	 that	 citizens	 should	 have	 a	 right	 to	
personal	 liberty,	 enjoy	 a	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 and	 not	 suffer	 punishment	 without	
conviction	 after	 due	 process	 (NSW	 LRC	 2012:	 ch	 2).	 Detention	 before	 trial	 offends	 these	
principles	and	so	 it	 should	be	strictly	 limited.	The	 laws	 relating	 to	bail	 should	ensure	 this,	by	
providing	that	bail	can	only	be	denied	if	it	is	likely	that	the	accused	person	will	abscond,	attempt	
to	 interfere	 with	 witnesses	 or,	 with	 the	 integrity	 of	 justice	 processes,	 threaten	 to	 harm	 the	
victim,	 individuals	or	 the	community,	or	commit	 further	 serious	offences.	These	decisions	are	
best	made,	in	the	first	instance,	by	police	and	then,	on	review,	by	the	judiciary,	on	the	basis	of	
evidence	particular	 to	 the	specific	case	and	 the	 individual	circumstances.	A	person	accused	of	
homicide	 in	 relation	 to	 a	mercy	killing	of	 a	partner	 suffering	 long‐term	crippling	pain	 should	
probably	be	released	on	bail	pending	 the	trial;	an	accused	serial	or	contract	killer	should	not.	
This	is	a	matter	for	judicial	discretion,	not	for	politicians	to	decide	in	advance	through	creating	
complex	 categories	 of	 offence	 based	 presumptions	which	 cut	 across	 the	 ability	 to	 assess	 the	
individual	merits	of	cases.	Are	 these	principles	 too	difficult	 for	politicians	 to	comprehend	and	
defend?	
	












and	 public	 interests.	 [But]	 the	 interest	 in	 liberty	 and	 fundamental	 principles	 is	
correctly	 seen	 as	 a	 collective,	 social,	 public	 interest.	 The	 issue	 then	 is	 one	 of	
reconciling	 or	 evaluating	 the	 strength	of	 competing	public	 interests.	 (NSW	LRC	
2012:	para	3.12;	Brown,	2013:	87,	emphasis	in	original)	
	
Finally,	 the	 NSW	 bail	 reform	 reversal	 offends	 two	 other	 important	 legal	 principles,	 those	 of	
generality	 and	 of	 reciprocity.	 Laws	 should	 be	made	 after	 careful	 consideration	 in	 relation	 to	
general	 states	 of	 affairs,	 not	 in	 relation	 to	 individual	 cases.	 Constantly	 changing	 the	 law	 after	
media	outcries	over	particular	cases	offends	the	principle	of	generality	and	produces	distortions	





















sentence	 originally	 given	 to	 Thomas	 Kelly’s	 killer,	 Kieran	 Loveridge,	 turned	 suddenly	 in	 the	
direction	 of	 a	 new	 ‘one	 punch	 law’,	 replete	with	 a	mandatory	 sentencing	 regime,	 which	was	
subsequently	adopted	in	different	forms	in	Victoria	and	Queensland.26	Indeed,	there	seems	little	
that	is	progressive	in	the	recent	rash	of	law	and	order	politics	and	legislation	across	a	number	of	




public	 policy	 making	 and	 certainly	 for	 any	 sudden	 about‐turns.	 As	 argued	 above,	 statistical	
evidence	as	to	how	the	new	Act	was	working	was	not	yet	available	and	our	analysis	of	the	case	
law	evidence	 revealed	no	major	problems	 in	 interpretation	of	 the	Act.	 In	 the	absence	of	 such	
evidence,	two	major	arguments	were	mounted.	First,	the	Review	Report	pitched	its	objections	
to	the	new	legislation	at	the	level	of	policy	disagreement,	claiming	that	‘the	review	has	not	been	









Parliament.	 Secondly,	 the	new	Attorney	General,	Brad	Hazzard,	 in	 the	 absence	of	 evidence	 to	
support	the	Government’s	position,	fell	back	on	that	old	favourite,	‘common	sense’;	the	Review	
Report	 recommendations	were	merely	 ‘common	 sense	 changes’	 (Hazzard	 2014:	 9).	 Law	 and	
order	‘commonsense’	has	a	long	pedigree.	As	argued	by	Hogg	and	Brown	(1998:	19):	
	
Commonsense	 is	 partial	 rather	 than	 wrong.	 By	 its	 very	 nature	 it	 resists	
engagement	with	other,	more	systematic	bodies	of	knowledge	where	these	resist	
commonsense	 assumptions.	 Commonsense	 is	 what	 ‘we	 all	 know’	 already.	 It	




Hogg	and	Brown	(1998:	21‐41)	 identify	 a	number	of	 ‘enduring	 themes’	within	 law	and	order	




side	 to	 law	 and	 order	 commonsense	 and	 that	 it	 is	 to	 ‘the	 fallibility	 of	 the	 system	 and	 the	
importance	 of	 not	 committing	 further	 crimes	 in	 the	 name	 of	 justice,	 punishment,	 sacrifice	 or	





translated	 into	 and	 through	 the	 forms	 of	 argument	 and	 the	 register	 of	 popular	 media	 and	
politics,	a	realm	in	which	emotion	and	affect	play	key	roles.	Criminal	justice	issues	arouse	strong	
emotions	and	lend	themselves	to	a	more	individualised	focus	than	other	types	of	news	stories.	
The	 focus	 is	 often	 on	 the	 victim,	 the	 language	 is	 emotive,	 constructing	 a	 virtual	 community	
around	 identification	 with	 particular	 high	 profile	 victims	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 cohesion	 that	 flows	
from	 widespread	 condemnation	 of	 the	 alleged	 offender	 (Quilter	 2014c).	 ‘Legal	 niceties’	 are	









present	 for	 trial	and	respect	 the	 integrity	of	 the	 trial	process,	 the	evidence,	witnesses,	victims	
and	 the	 community.	 The	 media	 outrage	 over	 the	 three	 specific	 bail	 decisions	 was	 focussed	
rather	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 alleged	 offences	 (in	 two	 cases,	 homicide),	 the	 gang	 affiliations	 of	
Mick	Hawi	and	Hassan	Ibrahim,	and	the	views	of	relatives	of	a	murder	victim.27		
	
Earlier	 we	 noted	 the	 vacuum	 that	 occurred	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 three	 contentious	 bail	
decisions,	 during	 which	 talk‐back	 radio	 and	 the	 Daily	 Telegraph28	were	 able	 to	 portray	 the	
decisions	as	putting	the	public	at	risk,	doing	a	disservice	to	the	victims	and	their	relatives,	and	
indicating	 the	 new	 Act	 and	 the	 government	 were	 ‘soft	 on	 crime’.	 We	 noted	 that,	 without	
published	 reasons	 for	 the	 decisions	 being	made	 available,	 the	 opportunity	 to	mount	 counter	
arguments	to	the	 ‘outrage’	 line	was	restricted.	When	the	decisions	did	become	available,	after	









Another	 question	worth	 some	 consideration	 is	 how	 both	 politicians	 and	 the	media	might	 be	
brought	 into	 some	 engagement	with	 the	 law	 reform	process	 in	ways	 that	makes	 them	better	
informed	 and	 more	 responsible?	 How	 was	 it	 possible	 for	 a	 Parliament	 that	 unanimously	
approved	and	passed	 the	new	Act	 in	May	2013,	 giving	 its	 imprimatur	 to	 the	 long	 law	 reform	
process,	 to	 perform	 such	 an	 about	 turn	 a	 year	 later	 and	 repudiate	 the	 key	 features	 of	 the	
legislation,	on	precious	 little	evidence	save	some	media	uproar	over	a	small	number	of	cases?	
What	 does	 this	 say	 about	 the	 level	 of	 commitment	 to	 legislative	 integrity	 and	 responsibility,	
about	 the	 quality	 of	 information	 provided	 to	 parliamentarians,	 about	 their	 comprehension	 of	
the	arguments	for	reform,	and	about	their	ability	to	articulate	and	defend	key	principles	central	
to	the	protection	of	legal	processes	and	liberties	in	a	democratic	society?	What	does	it	say	about	





that:	 ‘In	 removing	 a	 requirement	 that	 the	 bail	 authority	 gives	 regard	 to	 the	 presumption	 of	
innocence	 and	 the	 general	 right	 of	 liberty	when	making	bail	 decisions,	 the	Bill	 impacts	 these	
rights.	The	Committee	refers	these	matters	to	Parliament	for	further	consideration.’	(Legislation	
Review	 Committee	 2014:	 vii)	 This	 referral	 to	 the	 parliament	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 ignored.	
Why?	 What	 exactly	 would	 have	 been	 wrong	 with	 referring	 the	 report	 to	 a	 parliamentary	
standing	committee	for	further	consideration,	as	proposed	by	the	Australian	Greens	party?	Why	
did	the	Australian	Labor	Party	(ALP)	opposition	roundly	criticise	the	Amendment	Bill	and	yet	
still	 vote	 for	 it	 (Whitbourn	 2014)?	 Shadow	Attorney	General	 Paul	 Lynch	 said	 in	 debate:	 ‘The	
Opposition	does	not	oppose	the	bill	but	it	thinks	the	Government	has	not	the	slightest	idea	what	
it	 is	doing’	 (Lynch	2014:	6).	ALP	MP	Ron	Hoenig	echoed	the	refrain:	 ‘the	Opposition	does	not	
oppose	 this	 convoluted,	 dreadful	 bill,	 but	 it	 is	 bad	 public	 policy	 created	 by	 a	 panicked	
Government	 trying	 to	 curry	 favour	with	 a	 reactionary	media’	 (Hoenig	 2014:	 9).	 As	Mr	 Jamie	
Parker,	 Australian	 Greens	 MP	 for	 Balmain	 noted:	 ‘Opposition	 members	 have	 made	 some	








2009,	while	Attorney	General,	 in	 the	 then	ALP	government,	 rejected	 the	overtures	of	 the	 then	
Opposition	 (Coalition)	 Shadow	 Attorney	 General,	 Smith,	 to	 develop	 a	 bi‐partisan,	 evidence	
driven,	 fairer,	and	 less	costly	criminal	 justice	policy,	 taking	criminal	 justice	out	of	 the	 law	and	















inevitably	 reflected	 in	a	 final	 report	and	 in	 subsequent	 legislation.	This	 raises	 the	question	of	
whether	 different	 forms	 of	 consultative	 process	 might	 produce	 a	 more	 collective	 outcome.	
Might	 a	 ‘workshop’	 approach	built	 around	 selected	 scenarios,	 as	 later	 developed	by	 the	NSW	
Sentencing	Commission,29	work	better	to	focus	discussion,	highlight	the	empirical	evidence	and	





the	 deliberative	 process?	 Such	 a	 suggestion	 sounds	 a	 bit	 farfetched,	 but	 certain	 media	
commentators	 clearly	 have	 very	 strong	 views	 on	 how	 particular	 legal	 processes	 ought	 to	
operate	and	 it	might	be	of	benefit	 if	 those	views	were	able	to	be	articulated	 in	a	general	way,	
divorced	from	specific	cases,	and	in	an	environment	that	encouraged	them	to	be	constructive.	If	
the	 Ray	 Hadleys	 and	 Daily	 Telegraph	 editors	 of	 the	 world	 could	 somehow	 be	 given	 a	 voice	
during	the	official	process	of	law	reform	policy	formulation,	the	very	process	of	engagement	and	










costly	 in	monetary	 terms,	 its	 social	 consequences	are	profoundly	dysfunctional.	They	 include:	







prison	 numbers	 would	 be	 reduced;	 considerable	 financial	 savings	 would	 be	 achieved;	
Corrective	Services	would	be	freed	up	from	processing	so	many	people	received	into	prison	on	
remand	 for	 minor	 offences,	 enabling	 them	 to	 concentrate	 resources	 on	 programs	 for	 the	
convicted;	 better	 justice	would	be	 achieved	 for	 the	55	per	 cent	of	 those	 on	 remand	 (5,218	of	
10,342)	 who	 in	 2010	 in	 NSW	 were	 subsequently	 released	 to	 bail,	 received	 a	 non‐custodial	




coincide	with	 the	new	Act	 coming	 into	operation	but	 decided	not	 to	 go	 ahead.	 It	would	have	
been	timely	to	produce	a	follow	up	story	to	the	one	written	by	Joel	Gibson	in	the	Sydney	Morning	
Herald	 in	 2010	 under	 the	 headline	 ‘No	 Bail	 Go	 to	 Jail’,	 which	 focussed	 on	 the	 bashing	 of	 a	
subsequently	acquitted	remand	prisoner,	and	which	was	a	vehicle	 for	explaining	Greg	Smith’s	
reformist	 agenda	 (Gibson	2010).	 Journalistic	 traditions	of	 ‘more	bad	news’	 tend	 to	 gel	with	 a	
widespread	 political	 reluctance	 to	 argue	 for	 progressive	 change.	 This	 is	 a	 version	 of	 ‘don’t	
mention	the	war’;	or,	in	this	case,	don’t	mention	that	the	government	might	be	doing	something	
other	than	taking	a	‘tough’	(read	punitive)	stand	on	crime	and	punishment.	Governments	of	all	
persuasions	 are	 happy	 to	 trumpet	 an	 increase	 in	 penalties	 but	 often	 prefer	 to	 remain	 silent	
about	 programs	 or	 initiatives	 which	 attempt	 to	 reduce	 imprisonment	 rates,	 provide	






draconian.	 These	 attitudes	 have	 led	 to	 the	 entrenching	 of	 a	 ‘reform	 on	 the	 sly’	 approach,	
whereby	more	 progressive	 social	 and	welfare	 approaches	 to	 criminal	 justice	 issues,	 however	
much	evidence	can	be	marshalled	in	their	favour	and	however	successful,	are	not	promoted	lest	
they	draw	adverse	attention	and	claims	of	being	‘soft	on	crime’,	the	automatic	assumption	being	




widespread	 public	 support	 to	 point	 out	 that,	 despite	 the	 specific	 ‘weakness’	 that	 has	 been	
identified,	the	initiative	is	meritorious	and	beneficial	(and	at	the	very	least,	worth	being	allowed	







for	many	 accused	 and	 reduce	 the	 remand	 population	 in	 NSW	 prisons	 –	 was	 lost	 amidst	 the	
shouting	and	the	fear‐mongering.	The	ease	and	rapidity	with	which	these	laudable	goals	of	the	
new	 Act	 came	 to	 be	 characterised	 as	 undesirable	 and	 dangerous,	 effects	 ‘proved’	 by	 the	
outcomes	in	three	contentious	cases,	is	troubling.	Conspiratorial	theories	were	floated	including	
the	 suggestion	 that	 any	 increase	 in	 the	 proportion	 of	 accused	 persons	 being	 granted	 bail	
(characterised	in	the	media	as	a	‘bad’	thing)	could	be	attributable	to	deliberate	manipulation	by	
the	NSW	Police,	as	part	of	a	strategy	to	undermine	the	new	Act	(Olding	2014).	Police	Association	







Worthwhile	 law	 reform	 takes	 time.	 It	 requires	 ongoing	 political	 commitment,	 constant	
justification	and	community	and	media	engagement.	 It	 involves	restatement	of	the	underlying	
principles	 governing	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 full	 recourse	 to	 the	 available	 evidence,	 and	
recognition	that	sound	and	effective	reform	cannot	be	done	‘on	the	sly’	if	it	is	to	command	wide	





























7	 For	 an	 indication	 of	 the	 breadth	 of	 seminars	 hosted	 by	 Legal	 Aid	NSW,	 see	Bail	Act	2013	Training	 accessible	 at	
http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/for‐lawyers/professional‐development/bail‐act‐2013‐training	
8	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 Baird	 had	 only	 recently	 become	 Premier	 on	 17	 April	 2014	 following	 Barry	 O’Farrell’s	






to	 protect	 children	 and	 as	 part	 of	 the	 sentencing	 process	 when	 suggestions	 of	 future	 dangerousness	 arise:	
Alexandridis:	[33];	Lago:	[10]‐[12].	
11	The	discussion	of	(c)	and	(d)	was	redacted	in	the	published	version	of	the	Hawi	decision.	
12	A	 ‘Judgment	Summary’	 in	R	v	Hawi	 [2014]	NSWSC	837	was	made	available	on	23	 June	2014	(Supreme	Count	of	
NSW	 2014a).	 Unfortunately,	 the	 Judgment	 Summary	 (now	 unavailable	 on	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 website)	 did	 not	


































26	 See	 Safe	Night	Out	Legislation	Amendment	Act	2014	 (Qld)	 s	 314A	 ‘Unlawful	 striking	 causing	 death’	 (which	was	
passed	on	18	September	2014);	Sentencing	Amendment	(Coward’s	Punch	Manslaughter	and	Other	Matters)	Act	2014	
(Vic)	 s	4A	 ‘Manslaughter	–	 single	punch	or	strike	 taken	 to	be	dangerous	act’;	 and	Sentencing	Act	1991	 (Vic)	 s	9C	
which	provides	for	a	mandatory	minimum	for	such	offences	of	10	years	(passed	on	18	September	2014).	

















Notice	 or	 arrest.	 The	 intention	 was	 that	 the	 proportion	 of	 revocations	 of	 bail	 for	 minor	 technical	 breaches	 be	
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